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Oh, the places you’ll go! There is fun to be done!
There are points to be scored. There are games to be won.
And the magical things you can do with that ball
will make you the winning-est winner of all.
Fame! You’ll be famous as famous can be,
with the whole wide world watching you win on TV.
...
You’ll get mixed up, of course,
as you already know.
You’ll get mixed up
with many strange birds as you go.
So be sure when you step.
Step with care and great tact
and remember that Life’s
a Great Balancing Act.
Just never forget to be dexterous and deft.
And never mix up your right foot with your left.1

INTRODUCTION
International litigation is fraught with procedural issues, from
choice of forum and choice of law to forum non conveniens, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, anti-suit injunctions, and of
course, recognition of foreign judgments. To further complicate
things, as the Chevron-Ecuador story will demonstrate, as soon as one
of those procedural issues crops up, the rest will inevitably follow.
Indeed, international litigation can become incredibly complicated
and drawn out, at great cost to all parties—particularly when there
are parallel proceedings.2 The variety and utility of procedural
devices available when a dispute spans multiple countries creates
greater opportunity for abuse. If, for example, one forum will not
enforce a judgment that a litigant has obtained in a different
jurisdiction, that litigant (the judgment-creditor) could try to enforce
that judgment in a different forum where the defendant (the
judgment-debtor) may have assets.
This practice forces the
judgment-debtor to defend in multiple places. Likewise, defendants
can use tools like forum non conveniens or parallel proceedings to
drag out the litigation or force the plaintiff into a quick settlement.3
1. DR. SEUSS, OH, THE PLACES YOU’LL GO! (1990).
2. Indeed, parallel proceedings are not uncommon in international litigation.
See Walter W. Heiser, Using Anti-Suit Injunctions to Prevent Interdictory Actions
and to Enforce Choice of Court Agreements, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 855, 855.
3. See id. at 859.
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The presence of multiple potential fora and complicated questions of
choice of law or recognition of foreign judgments create great
potential for litigants to be procedurally abusive—particularly when a
potentially unfair judgment is involved and the plaintiff attempts to
enforce it by any means possible.
The infamous Chevron-Ecuador litigation presents many of the
procedural issues that arise in international disputes. During that
litigation, a class of plaintiffs from the Lago Agrio region (the
judgment-creditors) obtained a multi-billion dollar money judgment
in the Republic of Ecuador (ROE) against Chevron (the judgmentdebtor), and eventually attempted to enforce that judgment in fora
around the world.4 Chevron brought an action in the Southern
District of New York against the judgment-creditor seeking, among
other things, a preliminary injunction principally to bar enforcement
of the judgment outside of the ROE.5 Various common law tort and
RICO claims created the gravamen of the lawsuit, providing the basis
for jurisdiction over all the parties and, hence, the injunction. Judge
Kaplan granted Chevron’s request for a worldwide injunction against
the judgment-creditors pursuant to the anti-suit injunction analysis
articulated in China Trade & Development Corp. v. Choong Yong.6
The Second Circuit reversed that judgment in Chevron Corp. v.
Naranjo, concluding that China Trade’s anti-suit injunction standard
should not apply.7 The Second Circuit instead asserted that the
requested relief was an anti-enforcement injunction, and invoked
New York’s version of the 1962 Uniform Foreign Country Judgments
Recognition Act (the Recognition Act).8 The Second Circuit
concluded that a judgment-debtor could not affirmatively bring an
anti-enforcement action against a judgment-creditor when the
judgment-creditor has not yet tried to collect on that judgment in the
United States, despite declaring its intentions to do so in fora outside
the United States9

4. See infra note 79.
5. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594, 625–26.
6. Id. at 648 (citing China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d
33 (2d. Cir. 1987)).
7. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 423 (2012).
8. Id.; see also UNIF. FOREIGN-MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13
U.L.A. 261 (1962 & Supp. 2006) [hereinafter RECOGNITION ACT], available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20money%20judgments%20recog
nition/ufmjra%20final%20act.pdf.
9. See generally Naranjo. 667 F.3d at 232.

268

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit distinguished the
facts in Naranjo from those in a similar case, Shell Oil Co. v. Franco.10
In Shell Oil, the Central District of California issued a declaration of
non-enforceability under the DJA and California’s codification of the
Recognition Act before the judgment-creditor had technically sought
enforcement in California,11 albeit because the judgment-creditor had
named the wrong defendant in its prior enforcement action in
California.12
The judgment-debtors claimed that the relevant
Nicaraguan judgment would be unenforceable under U.S. law
because the Nicaraguan judicial system lacks impartial tribunals13 and
sufficient due process procedures, and the forum lacked personal
jurisdiction—each of which is mandatory grounds for non-recognition
under California’s version of the Recognition Act.14
Although the court in Shell Oil only granted declaratory relief
against enforcement within the United States, and did not attempt to
prevent the judgment-creditors from enforcing the judgment in other
countries, the decision is still informative; Shell Oil suggests that the
Second Circuit may have understated its ability to issue declaratory
relief against enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment—at least
within the United States.
This problem, particularly as posited by the court in Chevron Corp.
v. Donziger, raises a number of preliminary questions. What kind of
injunction was Chevron seeking, exactly? Was it an anti-enforcement
injunction (as the Second Circuit calls it) that should be evaluated in
light of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition
Act? Was it an anti-suit injunction that should be addressed in
relation to the existing circuit split on anti-suit injunctions?
Preemptive declaratory non-enforcement suits have also been
addressed in terms of ripeness, at least in the libel tourism context,15
adding to the complexity of U.S. judgment recognition law. Hence, is
a preemptive action like the preliminary injunction in Donziger
simply unripe, and therefore inadmissible in federal court? Cases like

10. See id. at 240–41; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Franco (Shell Oil II), No. CV 038846 NM (PJWx), 2005 WL 6184247 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).
11. Shell Oil II, 2005 WL 6184247, at *3.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *1.
14. Id. at *6. Shell Oil made other claims in its defense, which included lack of
subject matter jurisdiction (dismissed), and that enforcement of the judgment would
be repugnant to public policy. See Shell Oil Co. v. Franco (Shell Oil I), No. CV 03–
8846 NM (PJWx), 2004 WL 5615656, at *11–13 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004).
15. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lingue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo!
III), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lingue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, for
example, have looked at actions for a declaratory judgment of nonenforcement occurring before a judgment-creditor tries to enforce a
foreign judgment in the United States in terms of ripeness.16
Although dismissing the action for lack of ripeness does nothing to
solve the underlying problem, perhaps it is a threshold inquiry that
courts should adopt before proceeding to the merits of the case.
This Note addresses whether a U.S. court can provide a remedy to
preclude aggressive, multi-national enforcement of foreign money
judgments against a U.S. party. Assuming the foreign money
judgment in question is unenforceable under U.S. judgment
recognition law, if a judgment-creditor tries to enforce the judgment
in the United States, the U.S. judgment-debtor can assert one of
many defenses, depending on whether the relevant jurisdiction has
codified the Recognition Act or the updated 2005 version (the 2005
Recognition Act).17 The bigger problem, however, concerns whether
U.S. courts can prevent a judgment-creditor from initiating
enforcement actions all over the globe, forcing the judgment-debtor
to defend in multiple jurisdictions—and possibly forcing the
judgment-debtor to settle, if only to put an end to the aggressive
enforcement tactics. This problem will be addressed in the context of
the Chevron-Ecuador dispute.
Generally speaking, this Note’s discussion has four layers of legal
analysis: the Recognition Act—specifically, whether defenses to
recognition may be used affirmatively to support injunctions; the
relevance of the long-existent circuit split over how a court should
decide whether to issue an anti-suit injunction; the reach of the DJA;
and ripeness. This Note also focuses on each option’s policy
implications and impact on practitioners. It then discusses whether
such an injunction is really the remedy that a judgment-debtor like
Chevron seeks, or if there is another way a U.S. court can prevent
abusive multi-fora litigation—either in the context of the ChevronEcuador litigation specifically, or international litigation in general.
Indeed, aside from the lack of clarity regarding how a court should
rule in an action like Donziger, if none of the arguments that Chevron
made are viable, then the question becomes whether there is any
remedy courts can provide to litigants in their circumstances. If so,

16. See id. at 1211–23.
17. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13
U.L.A. pt. II 2007 Supp. pt. 5 (2005 & Supp. 2007) [hereinafter 2005 RECOGNITION
ACT], available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20
money%20judgments%20recognition/ufcmjra_final_05.pdf.
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then one might also ask exactly how, or if, they should provide that
remedy at all. This Note therefore examines the procedural routes
that Chevron attempted to take, whether any of them are viable, and
if not, propose an alternative remedy.
Part I discusses the origins of the Chevron-Ecuador litigation,
starting with the activity in Ecuador that led to Ecuadorian plaintiffs’
initial class action lawsuit. Part I also briefly outlines the relevant
Southern District of New York and Second Circuit holdings in this
litigation.
Part II summarizes the relevant law in this area, including (1) the
recognition of foreign-country judgments in the United States,
particularly the Recognition Act; (2) the standards for granting antisuit injunctions; (3) the factors courts balance in deciding whether to
grant a declaratory judgment under the DJA; and (4) ripeness
requirements in federal courts.
Part III outlines the decisions of the courts in Donziger and
Naranjo in more detail, and summarizes the conflict between the
district court and the Court of Appeals in the Chevron-Ecuador cases.
Part III evaluates the relevance of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in
Shell Oil and Yahoo! Part III also outlines the problems created by
the Second Circuit’s holding in Naranjo, and considers whether
another standard should have been applied.
Finally, Part IV discusses the problems the Naranjo decision
creates and evaluates the implications of each possible approach
courts could take when facing these circumstances. Part IV agrees
that the Recognition Act by itself does not create an affirmative cause
of action, but concludes that a federal district court can still enjoin
parties from enforcing a judgment if they can prove that the original
proceedings were fraudulent and the judgment would be
unenforceable under the Recognition Act—at least within the United
States. Part IV additionally suggests that the Second Circuit should
adopt a new test, loosely based on the China Trade factors, to
determine whether a court may issue an anti-enforcement injunction
enjoining a party from enforcing an unfair judgment outside the
United States—provided that the court has personal jurisdiction over
all the parties in question.
I. ORIGINS OF THE CHEVRON-ECUADOR LITIGATION
The ongoing Chevron-Ecuadorian litigation vividly illustrates the
problems courts face when deciding whether to recognize and enforce
substantial (and possibly unfair) foreign judgments, dismiss the action
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altogether, or issue an injunction of some kind. The history of this
litigation is both long and notorious.
Texaco, Inc. and its subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum (TexPet), first
engaged in oil exploration and drilling in the Ecuadorian Amazon’s
Oriente region from 1964 to 1992.18 The ROE, through a state-owned
oil agency known as Petroecuador, also participated in the venture,
obtaining a twenty-five percent share in a Consortium with TexPet
and Gulf Oil that was originally formed in 1965.19 Petroecuador
bought Gulf Oil’s share and became a majority stakeholder in the
Consortium in 1974.20 Petroecuador eventually took over TexPet’s
interests in the Consortium as well, acquiring complete control over
the Consortium in 1992.21 The oil companies allegedly polluted the
area, naturally angering the indigenous population, and dooming both
parties to a long, tiresome, and inevitably costly road through a
labyrinth of various court systems—both foreign and American.
In 1994, after the ROE bought TexPet out of the Consortium, a
group of Ecuadorian plaintiffs (the Aguinda plaintiffs) brought a
putative class action against Texaco in the Southern District of New
York, alleging that TexPet had committed several environmental
abuses, including improper disposal of hazardous waste and
destruction of tropical rainforests.22
A collection of Peruvian
plaintiffs, living downstream from the Aguinda plaintiffs, also brought
a similar putative class action against Texaco.23 Both complaints
alleged that TexPet’s operations in Ecuador between 1964 and 1992
severely polluted the rain forests and rivers in Ecuador and Peru, and
that the subsidiary’s actions in Ecuador were controlled by Texaco’s
operations in the United States.24
While the litigation in New York was pending, TexPet signed a
settlement agreement with the ROE, in which TexPet agreed to
“perform specified remedial environmental work in exchange for a

18. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda II), 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994).
23. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998).
24. Aguinda II, 303 F.3d at 473. A separate class action was also brought in
Texas, and was quickly dismissed by the Texas federal court on the grounds of forum
non conveniens and international comity. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61
(S.D. Tex. 1994).
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release of claims by [the Republic of Ecuador].”25 The settlement
covered any and all claims the ROE or Petroecuador would have
against Texaco, TexPet, and related companies in connection with the
Consortium.26 The Ecuadorian government also stated that all the
Aguinda plaintiffs’ claims belonged to the ROE, presumably with the
intention of putting an end to the Aguinda litigation.27 Three years
later, the ROE entered into an agreement stating that Texaco had
complied with the original settlement’s terms, and released TexPet
and related companies from liability “for items related to the
obligations assumed by TexPet in the Settlement.”28
Concerned that the ROE was an indispensable party under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which could have led to the dismissal of
the entire action due to sovereign immunity, the Aguinda plaintiffs
also entered into negotiations with the Ecuadorian government.29
Texaco had sought dismissal on the grounds that “Ecuadorian
governmental activity is inextricably intertwined in the events at
issue, thus making [the government of Ecuador and its agencies]
indispensable parties under [Rule] 19 which have not been joined,
and cannot be joined because of sovereign immunity.”30 At the
conclusion of these negotiations, the Aguinda plaintiffs agreed to
refrain from making claims against the Ecuadorian government and
its affiliates (including Petroecuador), and to refrain from collecting
any amount the court might award to Texaco against the Ecuadorian
government and its affiliates.31
Meanwhile, back in the Southern District of New York, Judge
Rakoff granted Texaco’s motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens and international comity.32 The Court also found the
existence of an independently sufficient ground for dismissal—
namely, failure to join an indispensible party under Rule 19.33 Judge
Rakoff relied on an earlier decision in the Southern District of Texas,
25. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo,
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 598–99.
30. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994).
31. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
32. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub
nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
33. Id.
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which had dismissed an action brought by a group of Ecuadorian
plaintiffs against Texaco for forum non conveniens and international
comity.34 In the Texas decision, the court applied the traditional
forum non conveniens analysis articulated in Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno35: first finding an available forum, and then weighing private
and public factors. The Texas court found that the majority of the
factors—that the witnesses were in Ecuador, the alleged tort took
place in Ecuador, the plaintiffs are Ecuadorian, and an Ecuadorian
court was unlikely to enforce a judgment from a U.S. court—weighed
in favor of finding Ecuador as the proper forum.36
Regarding the independent grounds for dismissing the action for
failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19, the Southern
District of New York noted that the “extensive equitable relief sought
by the plaintiffs—ranging from total environmental ‘clean-up’ of the
affected lands in Ecuador to a major alteration of the consortium’s
Trans–Ecuador pipeline to the direct monitoring of the affected lands
for years to come—cannot possibly be undertaken in the absence of
Petroecuador . . . .”37 Nonetheless, although Petroecuador and the
ROE were subject to service of process, neither could be joined,
because neither could be sued in the United States under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.38 When a necessary party is immune to
suit in the United States, that alone is usually enough to warrant
dismissal.39 Thus, Texaco’s motion was granted.40
The plaintiffs appealed Judge Rakoff’s decision to the Second
Circuit.41 The Second Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration,
primarily because it wanted Texaco to agree to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court system.42 Texaco eventually
consented to submit to the jurisdiction of Ecuador,43 and the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court’s second dismissal for forum non
conveniens in 2002.44

34. Id. (citing Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
35. Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 64 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981)).
36. Id.
37. Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. at 627.
38. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1604 (2012)).
39. Id. (citing Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 547–48 (2d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 818 (1991)).
40. Id.
41. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
42. Id. at 159.
43. See Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 807 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
44. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002).
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Chevron Corp. (Chevron) appeared on the scene in 2001 when it
acquired Texaco—after Texaco left the consortium and settled
environmental claims with the ROE.45 Soon after the dismissal for
forum non conveniens, the same American lawyers who brought the
first two putative class action suits brought another action in Ecuador
against Chevron for Texaco’s actions in Ecuador before 1992.46 The
plaintiffs in the litigation—the Lagro Agrio Plaintiffs (LAPs)—
included many of the Aguinda plaintiffs.47 The Ecuadorian provincial
court eventually entered a judgment against Chevron in the amount
of $8.646 billion.48
The Ecuadorian court’s judgment stated that it would double that
amount in punitive damages unless Chevron issued a “public
apology” to the LAPs within fifteen days.49 Chevron did not
apologize, and the judgment is now valued at over $18 billion.50
Unfortunately for the LAPs, Chevron had no assets in Ecuador.51
This hiccup, however, did not discourage them in the least. After the
judgment was issued in Ecuador, the LAPs’ attorneys stated that they
intended to collect on the judgment as soon as possible in multiple
jurisdictions around the world, even before the appeal was heard in
the Ecuadorian court system, as was their “right.”52 Soon afterwards
(and here lies the heart of our story), Chevron filed an action in the
Southern District of New York seeking a preliminary injunction to
halt enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment until a trial on the
merits of the case could be held.53 Substantively, Chevron’s complaint
asserted nine claims seeking damages and an injunction against
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment.54 The claims were asserted
against fifty-six defendants falling into four groups: Stephen Donziger
(the lead attorney for the LAPs) and his firm; Stratus Consulting, Inc.
(Stratus) (the company the LAPs hired to comment on the expert
report) and two of its employees; four Ecuadorian individuals and

45. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir.
Sept. 19, 2011) rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423, 184 (2012).
46. Id. at 594.
47. Id. at 600.
48. Id. at 621.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 660.
52. Id. at 594 n.4.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 625.
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entities that have participated in the Lago Agrian litigation in various
overlapping ways; and the LAPs themselves.55
The first two claims asserted substantive and conspiracy claims
under RICO against all defendants except the LAPs.56 In the third to
seventh counts, Chevron asserted against all defendants state tort
claims, including fraud, tortious interference with contract, trespass to
chattels, unjust enrichment on the ground that any recovery on the
Lago Agrio judgment would be inequitable, and a state claim for civil
conspiracy alleging that the defendants conspired to commit the
substantive violations described above.57 Against Donziger and his
law firm specifically, Chevron asserted violations of the New York
Judiciary Law governing the conduct of lawyers.58 Finally, Chevron
also sought a declaration, pursuant to the DJA, that the Lago Agrio
judgment is not entitled to recognition or enforcement in the United
States or anywhere else. 59 Thus, the preliminary injunction to stop
enforcement of the foreign judgment anywhere in the world was
merely a prelude to the underlying RICO, common law tort, and
other claims (although the RICO claims seem to have been the main
concern of those underlying claims, as evidenced by a later suit
Chevron brought in the Southern District of New York60).
In favor of the preliminary injunction Chevron argued, among
other things, that the judgment was unenforceable in the United
States because the proceedings in Ecuador did not comport with due
process, and the judgment was obtained by fraud.61 The district court,
after concluding that the matter was a sufficient controversy for
issuing declaratory relief,62 in a drastic move issued a worldwide
injunction to prevent the LAPs from enforcing the Ecuadorian
judgment.63 The district court justified its ability to issue a worldwide
declaratory action by concluding:
A declaratory judgment by this Court as to the enforceability of the
Ecuadorian judgment would finally determine the controversy over

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 625–26.
58. Id.; see N.Y. JUD. § 487 (McKinney 2005).
59. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
60. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
61. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
62. Id. at 637–38. The court concluded that the matter was a sufficient
controversy because the Ecuadorian court had issued a multibillion-dollar judgment,
and the LAP plaintiffs had specifically stated their intention to enforce the judgment
worldwide. Id.
63. Id. at 660.
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enforceability, at least for the United States and quite possibly more
broadly. Indeed, since equity acts in personam, the Court may issue
an injunction barring all of the defendants from filing enforcement
proceedings in other jurisdictions. Hence, this Court’s judgment
should finally determine the controversy worldwide.64

In deciding whether to issue the injunction, the district court
applied the factors articulated in China Trade,65 as well as those
articulated by the Second Circuit in Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods,
Ltd.66 to determine whether declaratory judgment was proper under
the DJA.67
After the Donziger decision, Chevron announced its intention to
appeal the Ecuadorian court’s judgment,68 which it did in March
2011.69 Unfortunately for Chevron, the Ecuadorian appellate judges
affirmed the judgment.70
Then, the Second Circuit reversed the Donzinger court’s decision
on appeal.71 In its opinion, the Second Circuit concluded that the
factors in China Trade were of “limited relevance” 72 because the
action was for an anti-enforcement injunction, rather than an anti-suit
injunction, and New York’s version of the Recognition Act does not
allow for a preemptive anti-enforcement injunction.73 Because the
LAPs had not yet sought to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in the
United States, the court concluded that Chevron had no claim under
the Recognition Act.74 Moreover, the Second Circuit found that

64. Id. at 638.
65. 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987). The district court stated that “[i]n this circuit,
China Trade . . . and its progeny provide the standard for determining when a court
may enjoin parties before it from commencing or pursuing litigation in foreign
jurisdictions.” Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
66. 346 F.3d 357, 359–60 (2d Cir. 2003).
67. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 637–38, 646–48.
68. Press Release, Chevron, Illegitimate Judgment Against Chevron in Ecuador
Lawsuit (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/
02142011_illegitimatejudgmentagainstchevroninecuadorlawsuit.news.
69. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Appeals Ecuador Judgment (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/03112011_chevronappealsecua
dorjudgment.news.
70. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Condemns Illegitimate Decision by
Ecuador Appellate Court (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/
pressreleases/article/01032012_chevroncondemnsillegitimatedecisionbyecuadorappell
atecourt.news.
71. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
423 (2012).
72. Id. at 243.
73. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304 (McKinney 2012).
74. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 242.
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although Chevron sought the injunction under the far-reaching DJA,
the rights conferred by that Act were “procedural only” and “do[] not
create an independent cause of action.”75 In almost every other suit
for declaratory judgment, the suit is brought by the judgmentcreditor, and the judgment-debtor defends against enforcement
pursuant to the Recognition Act.76 No part of the Act allows for
preemptive suits for declaratory action by the judgment-debtor
before the judgment-creditor has tried to enforce the judgment in that
jurisdiction.77 Finally, the Second Circuit looked to international
comity considerations and concluded that interpreting the
Recognition Act to allow courts to grant worldwide injunctions would
disrespect other sovereign judicial systems.78
Since the Second Circuit’s reversal of Judge Kaplan’s global antienforcement injunction, the LAPs have brought actions to enforce
the Ecuadorian judgment in Canada, Argentina, and Brazil.79 Adding
another twist to the story, Chevron has recently filed the declaration
of a former Ecuadorian judge in the Southern District of New York,80
in which the judge, Alberto Guerra, described how he and another
former judge “allowed the LAPs’ lawyers to ghostwrite their entire
188-page, $18.2 billion judgment against Chevron in exchange for a
promise of $500,000 from the anticipated recovery.”81 Thus, if the
affidavit is true, it is important to mention that notwithstanding the
rulings discussed in this Note, the Ecuadorian judgment would not be

75. Id. at 244–45 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 240.
77. Id. The court also said the structure of the Recognition Act was “clear” and
did not allow for preemptive suits by the judgment-debtor. Id.
78. Id. at 242.
79. Eduardo Garcia, Ecuador Plaintiffs Target Chevron’s Assets in Brazil,
REUTERS, June 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/28/us-ecuadorchevron-idUSBRE85R01I20120628; Pablo Gonzalez, Ecuador to Sue Chevron in
Argentina to Enforce Judgment, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-31/ecuador-to-sue-chevron-in-argentinato-enforce-judgment; Stephen G.A. Pitel, Enforcement of the Ecuadorian Judgment
Against Chevron in Ontario: The Ontario Law, OPINIO JURIS (June 1, 2012, 10:30
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/01/enforcement-of-ecuadorian-judgment-againstchevron-in-ontario-the-ontario-law.
80. See Alberto Guerra Bastidas, Sworn Declaration, (Nov. 12, 2012)
http://www.theamazonpost.com/wp-content/uploads/Declaration-of-AGuerra_English-REDACTED.pdf.
81. Roger Parloff, Ex-Judge Says He Was Bribed by Ecuadorians’ Suing Chevron,
CNNMONEY (Jan. 28, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/
01/28/judge-chevron-ecuador.

278

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

recognizable under U.S. law if the LAPs attempt to enforce it in the
United States.82
II. RELEVANT LAW
This Part provides the background necessary to understand the
issues posed by the Donziger and Naranjo decisions within the
Chevron-Ecuador litigation, which are discussed in further detail in
Part III. Part II.A discusses the relevant law on recognition of
judgments. Part II.B outlines the relevant domestic law on granting
anti-suit injunctions, and their possible application to anti“enforcement” injunctions (as the Second Circuit calls them, and as
this Note refers to them). Part II.C reviews the DJA, and, finally,
Part II.D summarizes the applicable law on ripeness requirements in
the federal court system and their possible relevance to preemptive
requests for anti-enforcement injunctions. Each legal regime is
integral to understanding the issues posed by Donziger and Naranjo,
because the courts in both cases examine multiple legal arguments in
deciding whether to permit the worldwide preliminary injunction
against the LAPs. Both the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit, for example, discuss the relevance of the anti-suit
injunction test, the DJA, and the Recognition Act.83 Neither
discusses whether the action is ripe, but the related Yahoo! case84 also
involved a claim for a declaration of non-enforceability of a foreign
judgment before a proceeding to enforce that judgment was brought
in the United States, and some of judges in the splintered en banc
Yahoo! opinion did conduct a ripeness analysis.85

82. See RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 4(a)(1) (identifying one of the grounds
for non-recognition, namely, when “the judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process of law”). As noted below, some version of the Recognition Act has
been codified by most states. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
83. See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240–45; Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d
581, 632–38, 646–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo,
No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 423, 184 (2012).
84. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lingue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo!
III), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
85. See id. at 1201.
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A. Recognition of Foreign (Money) Judgments in the United
States
There is currently no federal statute governing recognition of
foreign judgments in the United States.86 The United States is also
not a party to any international treaty or convention on recognition
and enforcement of foreign-country judgments.87 Despite these facts,
the United States appears to be the most receptive of any major
country to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.88
Traditionally, state decisional law governs recognition of foreign
country judgments.89 Thus, there is some variation among the several
states regarding whether a foreign judgment will be enforced against
the judgment-debtor’s assets. Regardless of whether a state has
codified the Recognition Act or relies on common law, “no state
recognizes or enforces the judgment of another state rendered
without jurisdiction over the judgment-debtor.”90
In Hilton v. Guyot, a landmark decision in U.S. judgment
recognition law, the United States Supreme Court based its judgment
on the principle of international comity, setting the precedent U.S.
courts must follow when determining the extent of recognition and
enforceability of foreign court judgments.91 The Court held that

86. Edward H. Davis, Jr. & Annette C. Escobar, A Practitioner’s Guide to
Enforcement of Foreign Country Money Judgments in the United States, in
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 131 (Barton Legum ed.,
2005).
87. See Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 629,
629–30 (2012); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 472 (3d ed. 2006). Negotiations on this subject at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law have broken down, albeit due to disputes
over jurisdiction of courts rather than enforcement of judgments. Id.
88. See LOWENFELD, supra note 87 at 473; see also Richard J. Graving, The

Carefully Crafted 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition
Act Cures a Serious Constitutional Defect in Its 1962 Predecessor, 16 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L L. 289, 290 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW ch. 8, intro. (1987)). U.S. receptiveness to foreign-country judgments is not
often returned, presumably due to the high damage awards in U.S. negligence cases
(particularly in products liability suits). DAVID EPSTEIN & CHARLES S. BALDWIN, IV,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY
376 (4th rev. ed. 2010). The liberality and size of American damage awards is an
impediment to the United States’ ability to enter into multi- or bilateral treaties with
other countries, putting the United States at a disadvantage with countries who are
parties to such agreements. Id.
89. See, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121
(N.Y. 1926).
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW ch. 8, intro. note (1987).
91. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163; see EPSTEIN & BALDWIN, IV, supra note 88, at 377.
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recognition of foreign-country judgments was a matter of the “comity
of nations,”92 and described the principle of comity as follows:
‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.93

The Court in Hilton also outlined specific situations where comity
should be followed, including scenarios in which the foreign
proceeding was conducted before a court of “competent jurisdiction”
and no fraud could be shown.94 The Court’s articulation of the
principle of international comity has remained the most authoritative
passage from Hilton, despite the suggestion that it was merely dicta.95
In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (the Commissioners) created a recommended uniform
state statute for recognition of foreign country money judgments in
the United States.96 The 1962 Recognition Act claimed to present
“rules that have long been applied by the majority of courts in this
country.”97 Some thirty states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands have adopted the Recognition Act in some form.98

92. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163.
93. Id. at 163–64.
94. The Hilton Court described specific situations where comity should be
followed:
[W]e are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for a full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial
upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those
of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court,
or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought
in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an
appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was
erroneous in law or in fact. The defendants, therefore, cannot be permitted,
upon that general ground, to contest the validity or the effect of the
judgment sued on.
Id. at 202–03.
95. LOWENFELD, supra note 87, at 491 n.2.
96. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8.
97. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, Prefatory Note.
98. Graving, supra note 88 at 293.
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The Act defines a “foreign state” as “any governmental unit other
than the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth,
territory, insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands,”99 and
“foreign judgment” as “any judgment of a foreign state granting or
denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes,
a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or
family matters.”100 The Act also states that it applies to “any foreign
judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered
even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to
appeal.”101 Generally speaking, unless one of the grounds for nonrecognition come in to play, the Act considers a judgment conclusive
when it grants or denies a sum of money, which makes it enforceable
in the same way other U.S. states must recognize each others’
judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.102 The various grounds for non-recognition under the
Recognition Act include multiple situations, such as where “the
judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law,” there was no personal jurisdiction, or the foreign
judgment was obtained by fraud.103
In 2005, the Commissioners adopted a revision of the 1962 Act,
making a few “perfecting” changes.104 The 2005 Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act, like its predecessor,
seeks to promote uniformity and gain wider acceptance of U.S.
judgments abroad.105 Only three states have adopted the 2005 Act.106
The remaining twenty or so states that have not adopted either the
1962 or the 2005 Act rely on common-law notions of “comity,” 107
along with sections of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law.108 Most states, however, have maintained their codification of
the 1962 Recognition Act.109 New York, one of the busiest states for

99. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 1(1).
100. Id. § 1(2).
101. Id. § 2.
102. Id. § 3; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
103. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 4 (a)(1)–(2), (b)(2).
104. Graving, supra note 88, at 289. Some argue that the 2005 revisions cure a
constitutional defect in its 1962 predecessor. Id. at 289–90.
105. Id. at 290–91; see 2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 17.
106. See Graving, supra note 88, at 293.
107. Id.
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481, 482 (1987).
109. Graving, supra note 88, at 293.
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international litigation, has adopted the 1962 Act, with significant
changes.110
Most importantly for the purposes of the ChevronEcuador litigation, fraud is one of the discretionary grounds for nonrecognition under New York’s version of the Recognition Act.111
Further, the 1964 Act provides that it is a mandatory ground for nonrecognition if “the judgment was rendered under a system which does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”112 Chevron argued in Donziger
that the Ecuadorian judgment would not be enforceable in the United
States because the proceedings in Ecuador did not comport with due
process, and that the judgment was obtained by fraud because the
LAPs’ attorneys (among several other things) “ghostwrote” the
appointed expert’s report and intimidated the Ecuadorian judges.113
B.

Anti-Suit Injunctions

Even before a judgment is reached, one of the most valuable (and
possibly irritating) tools available to parties involved in international
disputes is the anti-suit injunction. Anti-suit injunctions show up
most frequently in parallel proceedings, either internationally or
domestically—where a single dispute is litigated simultaneously in
front of two or more different courts.114 Parties often have several
choices regarding the country in which to litigate a transnational
dispute, and therefore parallel litigation is not uncommon.115 Most
anti-suit injunction cases deal with parallel actions in the United
States and another country.116
U.S. federal Circuit courts unanimously agree that federal district
courts have the power to issue anti-suit injunctions against parties
subject to their jurisdiction.117 The Circuits also agree that anti-suit

110. Id. at 293; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5303 (McKinney 1997).
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(3) (McKinney 1997).
112. Id. § 5304(a)(1).
113. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592, 607, 611–12 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL
4375022 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v.
Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
114. José I. Astigarraga & Scott A. Burr, Antisuit Injunctions, Anti-Antisuit
Injunctions, and Other Worldly Wonders, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION:
STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 89 (Barton Legum, ed. 2005).
115. Heiser, supra note 2, at 855.
116. Id. at 856.
117. David J. Levy, Antisuit Injunctions in Multinational Cases, in
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S.
FEDERAL COURTS 163–64 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (citing Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles
Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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injunctions should be used “sparingly.”118 The Circuits are split,
however, on what standard should be used in deciding whether to
grant an anti-suit injunction rather than stay their own proceedings or
let both actions proceed to judgment. Scholars have called the two
sides of the split “liberal” and “restrictive,”119 or sometimes “liberal”
and “conservative.”120
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits (and possibly the Seventh Circuit as
well) remain on the “liberal” side of the split.121 These Circuits have
held that district courts may issue anti-suit injunctions when litigation
in a foreign forum would become vexatious and delay efficient
proceedings, rather than focusing on international comity.122
Regarding the “liberal” side of the Circuit split, the main criticism is
that this approach somehow conveys the message that the court
issuing the anti-suit injunction is suggesting that it has “so little
confidence in the foreign court’s ability to adjudicate a given dispute
fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling to even allow the
possibility.”123 It has also been suggested that if anti-suit injunctions
are easily available, both courts will be able to issue these injunctions
and essentially paralyze the litigation.124
On the “conservative” or “restrictive” side of the split are the First,
Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits.125

118. See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. Nat’l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852,
855 (9th Cir. 1981); Philip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1958).
119. See Levy, supra note 117, at 164.
120. Heiser, supra note 2, at 857–58.
121. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996); Allendale Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys. Inc., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey
Club, 652 F.2d 852.
122. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (holding that a district court does not abuse its
discretion in issuing an anti-suit injunction “when it has determined that allowing
simultaneous prosecution of the same action in a foreign forum . . . would result in
inequitable hardship and tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficiency
determination of the case”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Seattle Totems
Hockey Club, 652 F.2d 852 (affirming a district court’s anti-suit injunction when it
considered “the convenience to the parties and witnesses, the interest of the courts in
promoting the efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to one
party or the other, and concluded that the equitable balance weighs heavily in favor
of plaintiffs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123. Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d
355, 360 (8th Cir. 2007).
124. Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354–55 (6th Cir. 1992).
125. See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491
F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2007); Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.
2004); Stonington Partners v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., 310 F.3d 118
(3d Cir. 2002); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992);
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The general rule in these jurisdictions is to allow parallel proceedings
“on the same in personam claim” to “proceed simultaneously, at least
until judgment is reached in one which can be pled as res judicata in
the other.”126 The idea is that international comity would favor not
issuing an anti-suit injunction out of respect for the sovereignty of
other court systems.127 These Circuits elevate the principle of
international comity to a higher level than the “liberal” circuits do,
holding that a foreign anti-suit injunction will be granted only to
protect the jurisdiction of a U.S. court or important public policies of
the forum.128 Critics of the “conservative” approach argue that where
public international issues are not involved, efficiency should be
promoted over international comity—after all, parallel proceedings
are long, drawn out, and expensive.129 Moreover, allowing parallel
proceedings to go forward inevitably leads to a “race to judgment,”
which is completely dependent upon the efficiency and methods of
procedure within the parallel jurisdictions.130
A modified restrictive approach might mitigate this concern. The
Second Circuit, for example, adopted a more flexible version of the
conservative approach by factoring in whether adjudications of the
same issues in separate actions would lead to a race to judgment.131
Specifically, the test articulated in China Trade begins by inquiring
“(1) whether the parties to both suits are the same and (2) whether
resolution of the case before the enjoining court would be dispositive
of the enjoined action.”132 Next, the court looks at a variety of other
factors, such as the “vexatiousness” of the parallel proceeding,
whether the two actions will lead to a race to judgment causing
additional expense, “whether the foreign action threatens the
China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
126. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926–27.
127. See Heiser, supra note 2, at 859 (2011).
128. See, e.g., China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36–37 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that avoiding
vexatiousness or a race to judgment is not enough to satisfy international comity
requirements, adding the jurisdictional and public policy factors); see also Laker
Airways, 731 F.3d at 934 (enjoining the defendants in that litigation from litigating in
a British court to protect its own jurisdiction).
129. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996).
130. See Kathryn E. Vertigan, Note, Foreign Antisuit Injunctions: Taking A
Lesson from the Act of State Doctrine, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 173 (2007).
131. See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35–36; see also Vertigan, supra note 130, at 172–
73. Interestingly, the Second Circuit also does not take into account the citizenship of
the parties at hand. See Margarita Treviño de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin or

Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United
States, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79, 107 (1999).
132. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
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jurisdiction of the enjoining forum, and . . . whether strong public
policies of the enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign
action.”133
The anti-suit injunction Circuit split is relevant because the
Donziger court applied the China Trade factors (the relevant
standard in the Second Circuit) in deciding whether to grant an
injunction enjoining the LAPs from suing for enforcement.134 There is
no literature on whether anti-suit injunction analysis should apply to
claims for anti-enforcement injunctions (particularly before the
judgment-creditor has tried to enforce the judgment). After all,
parallel proceedings usually apply when there are multiple identical
actions going on at the same time in multiple fora. Nor is there
literature on whether a court can issue an anti-enforcement action (as
the Second Circuit calls it) under the same standards.
C.

The Declaratory Judgment Act

Chevron also argued that the requested injunction was merely a
claim for a declaratory judgment.135 The DJA allows a district court
to declare the legal rights or legal relations of an interested party
seeking the declaration in a case of actual controversy within that
court’s jurisdiction.136 Any such declaration will have “the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such.”137 Like the Recognition Act, the rights afforded by the DJA
are procedural only,138 and do not create an independent cause of
action.139 Courts have held consistently that the DJA contains a
broad grant of discretion to district courts “to refuse to exercise
jurisdiction over a declaratory action that they would be otherwise
empowered to hear.”140
When there is a valid basis for a declaratory judgment, however,
the relevant test to apply in the Second Circuit is the balancing test

133. Id. (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927, 937).
134. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 646–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo,
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
135. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012). It seems that
Chevron was arguing for everything and anything that could support the injunction.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
137. Id.
138. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
139. Davis v. United States, 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007).
140. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 346 F.3d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 2003).
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set forth in Dow Jones.141 In Dow Jones, the court looked to a set of
factors to guide its decision of whether to exercise the discretion
granted by the DJA.142 Those factors built on an older test the
Second Circuit adopted, considering “(1) whether the judgment will
serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues
involved; and (2) whether a judgment would finalize the controversy
and offer relief from uncertainty.”143 The court noted that other
Circuits have built more factors into the test, which include:
1) whether the proposed remedy is being used merely for
‘procedural fencing’ or a ‘race to res judicata’; 2) whether the use of
a declaratory judgment would increase friction between sovereign
legal systems or improperly encroach on the domain of a state or
foreign court; and 3) whether there is a better or more effective
remedy.144

The court in Dow Jones applied all five of these factors, and since
then, the Second Circuit has seen fit to apply all five together as a
unified test to determine whether to grant a declaratory judgment.145
A district court’s application of these factors is typically reviewed for
abuse of discretion.146
D. Ripeness
Although the Donziger and Naranjo courts did not address the
injunction in terms of ripeness, preemptive declaratory nonenforcement actions in other areas (such as in libel tourism cases)
have been discussed in terms of ripeness before.147 In the federal
court system, ripeness is drawn from both Article III of the United
States Constitution and “prudential reasons for refusing to exercise
jurisdiction.”148
A given action must satisfy two prudential

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 417 F.2d 998, 1001 (2d
Cir. 1969)).
144. Id. at 359–60. The district court in Dow Jones pulled those factors from other
Circuits. Id.; see also NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros y Maquilas de Occidente, S.A. de
C.V., 28 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1994); Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984).
145. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 2012).
146. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2006).
147. See, e.g., Yahoo! III, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the
court had personal jurisdiction over an Internet service provider’s suit for declaration
that a French order to block French access to certain websites was unenforceable in
the United States, and eight of the judges addressed ripeness).
148. See U.S. CONST. art. III; Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803,
808 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)).
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requirements for ripeness: “the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.”149 Courts must generally consider the facts at hand to
see if they present the problems of “prematurity and abstractness”
that counsel against reaching the merits of a given case.150
III. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE CHEVRON-ECUADOR LITIGATION
This Part lays out the issues posed by the Donziger and Naranjo
decisions in the Chevron-Ecuador litigation. It outlines four possible
ways to deal with this Note’s overarching, initial question: whether a
U.S. court can (or should be able to) provide any remedy precluding
enforcement of an unfair foreign money judgment, particularly before
the plaintiffs have tried to enforce the judgment in the United States.
Before that question can be answered, however, the preliminary
question of what underlying legal analysis applies to this injunction
(which was implicitly discussed in Donziger and Naranjo when the
courts applied multiple legal analyses) must be addressed, if only to
figure out what exactly happened. If the district court was right, and
an anti-enforcement injunction is in reality no different from an antisuit injunction, then that poses a different set of problems than the
Second Circuit’s assertion that the Recognition Act alone applies, but
cannot apply (even in conjunction with the DJA) unless the LAPs try
to enforce the judgment in the United States.
If the anti-enforcement action fails because of lack of ripeness,
then theoretically the issue could not have been decided at that
time—at least not until the LAPs try to enforce the judgment in the
United States. In other words, if the case is unripe until the plaintiffs
try to enforce the judgment, then once the plaintiffs try to enforce the
judgment in the United States, the Second Circuit is correct that the
judgment-debtor may make use of the various grounds for nonrecognition listed in New York’s codification of the Recognition
Act.151

149. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), abrogated by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
150. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972); see also Yahoo! III,
433 F.3d at 1211 (en banc) (discussing the standards for ripeness) (quoting Socialist
Labor Party, 406 U.S. at 588). Much more could be said on the standards governing
ripeness in federal courts, but the details provided in this section are sufficient for
purposes of this Note’s discussion.
151. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2012)(“The sections on
which Chevron relies provide exceptions from the circumstances in which a holder of
a foreign judgment can obtain enforcement of that judgment in New York; they do
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The following Parts evaluate the relevant court decisions in the
Chevron-Ecuador litigation, as well as some other possible answers to
this Note’s preliminary question and the implications that those
answers would have on the overarching question. Part III.A discusses
the problems posed by the Donziger decision. Part III.B analyzes the
Naranjo decision. Part III.C discusses a decision issued by the Ninth
Circuit, Shell Oil Co., which is relevant to the Naranjo decision
because it was cited by the Second Circuit as possibly interpreting the
DJA and the Recognition Act to allow the declaration of nonenforceability of a foreign money judgment in the United States
before the foreign plaintiffs had (technically) sought enforcement.
Part III.D addresses the background to the Yahoo! decision, and its
possible relevance to the issue at hand.
A. The Donziger Decision
When the Donziger court granted the worldwide injunction against
the LAPs, it was part of a long and carefully thought-out opinion,
detailing the history of the litigation and the various claims Chevron
made against the LAPs.152 In arriving at the decision to grant the
worldwide injunction (establishing the history of the litigation, the
role of the attorney Donziger, the allegations of corruption, and the
UNCITRAL arbitration), Judge Kaplan first discussed the standards
for issuing a preliminary injunction.153 In the Second Circuit, “[a]
party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish irreparable
harm and either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.”154 Judge Kaplan determined
the evidence established that “the LAPs and their allies intend
quickly to pursue multiple enforcement actions and asset seizures,
including ex parte remedies where possible, around the globe,” and
without a preliminary injunction, “Chevron would be forced to
defend itself and litigate the enforceability of the Ecuadorian
judgment in multiple proceedings.”155 The court also mentioned that

not create an affirmative cause of action to declare foreign judgments void and enjoin
their enforcement.”).
152. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo,
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
153. Id. at 626.
154. Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002).
155. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626–27.
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there was a great risk that Chevron’s assets would be seized or
attached, disrupting Chevron’s supply chain and damaging the
goodwill it has with its customers, and concluded that Chevron was
threatened with immediate and irreparable injury.156 Judge Kaplan
concluded that the aforementioned threatened harm would be
irreparable, and even if the LAPs collected before the validity of the
judgment was determined, Chevron would not be able to get the
money back.157 The opinion noted that there would be no remedy for
the coercive effect of litigating in multiple places—the damage would
have already been done.158 Plus, the damages would have been
“difficult to establish and measure,” meaning that, for both reasons,
equitable relief was appropriate.159
The Donzinger court also found that Chevron had established
imminence in light of the relevant law. The LAPs, the court said, may
even now seek “preventive measures” in freezing Chevron’s assets in
other countries.160 As soon as the appeal had been decided (unless
the judgment was overturned), the LAPs could start running all over
the world to try to enforce the judgment. Moreover, Judge Kaplan
wrote that “[g]iven the history and circumstances of this case, there is
substantial reason to believe that the process will move quickly.”161
Indeed, the
Then, the “game would change dramatically.”162
pendency of a further appeal in Ecuador would not stop recognition
and enforcement proceedings here, unless the judgment was found
unenforceable in Ecuador.163
Next, the district court determined that the availability of appellate
remedies and a possible stay in the Ecuador proceedings did not
preclude finding the threat of irreparable injury because the showing
of likely success on the merits (in proving that Ecuador did not
provide impartial tribunals) would “foreclose[] the propriety of
assuming that the judgment debtor will receive due process in the
appellate process in the rendering nation.”164 The district court

156. Id. at 627.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 628 (citing Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
160. Id. at 630.
161. Id. at 629.
162. Id. at 630.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 631.
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discussed the balance of hardships, and determined that the balance
tipped in favor of Chevron.165
Turning to the likelihood of success on the merits, the district court
determined that the Ecuadorian judgment was not entitled to
recognition or enforcement and that Chevron showed the requisite
likelihood of success on its claim that Ecuador did not provide
impartial tribunals and due process.166 The court looked to New
York’s codification of the Recognition Act in Article 53 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules.167
Regarding recognition and enforcement, Judge Kaplan summed up
the body of law in that area starting with Hilton.168 He noted that
“[i]n determining whether a foreign legal system ‘provide[s] impartial
tribunals [and] procedures compatible with due process of law,’ a
court considers not only the structure and design of the judicial
system at issue, but also ‘its practice during the period in question.’”169
The court concluded that the Ecuadorian court had not provided for
impartial tribunals. In coming to that decision, the court looked to a
report from Vladimiro Alvarez Grau (the Alvarez Report), prepared
in September 2010. The court described Alvarez as “an impressively
credentialed expert who has practiced law in Ecuador for nearly forty
years and has held numerous elected and appointed public offices and
legal academic positions in that country.”170 The Alvarez Report
concluded that the Ecuadorian court system habitually failed to act
impartially—that the President has control and threatens and
pressures the judges.171 The court also made much of the fact that
Donziger himself, in opposing Texaco’s motion for forum non
conveniens in the original action in the Southern District of New

165. Id. According to the court, Chevron would suffer greater harm from the
mistaken denial of a preliminary injunction here than would the LAPs if the
injunction were granted. If the injunction were mistakenly denied, the LAPs would
enforce the judgment, creating the aforementioned irreparable injury. A stay
pending the decision of the Ecuador National Court of Justice would not alter the
conclusion because if Chevron established a likelihood of success in proving that
Ecuador did not provide for impartial tribunals, then there is no reason to grant a
stay, and a stay would place a huge bond at the disposal of the Ecuadorian court
system. Id.
166. Id. at 632–33.
167. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5304(a)–(b) (McKinney 1997); see also RECOGNITION ACT,
supra note 8, §§ 4(a)–(b).
168. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 632–33.
169. Id. at 633 (citing Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir.
2000)).
170. Id. at 616 n.163.
171. Id. at 633–34.
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York, had described the Ecuadorian court system as corrupt,
declaring that it was the judges’ “birthright . . . to be corrupt!”172 And
yet, here he was, extolling the virtues of the Ecuadorian justice system
in an attempt to enforce the Ecuadorian court’s multi-billion dollar
judgment.
The district court also looked to independent commentators
(quoted in the Alvarez Report) as well as other independent
sources.173 The district concluded that Chevron was likely to prevail
on the contention that the judgment was rendered in a system that
“does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
the requirements of due process of law,”174 and that it had
demonstrated serious questions going to the merits of that issue.
The district court also determined that there was ample evidence
that the judgment was fraudulent.175 The LAPs had submitted forged
expert reports; indeed, their counsel ghostwrote much of Cabrera’s
(the supposed independent expert’s) report and had other improper
contacts with Cabrera.176 The LAPs did issue “cleansing reports”
after the improper contacts with Cabrera were revealed.177 Those
reports, however, substantially relied on Cabrera’s findings, and
because the judge in Ecuador considered some of the reports in
issuing the judgment, it would be impossible to separate the tainted
172. Id. at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is worth emphasizing,
however, that it was Texaco (as Chevron’s predecessor) who wanted the case
dismissed for forum non conveniens in the first place because Ecuador was allegedly
the better place for the LAPs to assert their claims, only to have Chevron later
complain about the fraudulent Ecuadorian court system in New York once it had
ruled in the LAPs’ favor. See supra Part I. Thus, the irony lies on both sides—
Chevron (or Texaco, depending on the time period) got exactly what it had asked for,
but not as expected. Indeed, Texaco probably never expected a suit to be filed in
Ecuador—at least not a class action of this magnitude. Even if a suit had been filed
in Ecuador, it has been noted that at the time, the Ecuadorian government (and
hence court system) would have been favorable to Texaco’s interests. See Suraj Patel,

Delayed Justice: A Case Study of Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador's Operations,
Harms, and Possible Redress in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 85
(2012). Unfortunately for Chevron when it acquired the litigation later down the
road, along with a change in power, there was also a change in Ecuador’s view of the
litigation. Id. at 84 (“Soon after the desired dismissal [by Judge Rakoff], Ecuador's
new government under President Abdalá Bucaram reversed its opposition to the
lawsuit and joined the plaintiffs in asking the court to reconsider the dismissal.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this story shows, international
litigation does not always go as planned—it is subject to a given jurisdiction’s political
climate and its tendency to change quickly and drastically.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. See id. at 637.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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report from the final judgment in Ecuador.178 Thus, the Donzinger
court held that Chevron had raised substantial questions as to
whether the judgment in Ecuador was a result of fraud.179
Finally, the Donzinger court held that this case was appropriate for
declaratory judgment.180 Applying the factors articulated in Dow
Jones,181 the court held that this was clearly a case of actual
controversy; the Ecuadorian court had issued a multibillion-dollar
judgment against Chevron, and the LAPs had specifically articulated
their intention to enforce that judgment all over the world “as soon as
possible and certainly no later than when the initial appeal is decided,
which could occur in a matter of days once the court’s clarifications
issue.”182
The court also held that a declaratory judgment would resolve the
controversy over the judgment’s enforceability, at least within the
United States and “quite possibly more broadly” (although it did not
articulate why a declaratory judgment in the United States would
resolve the controversy “more broadly”). 183 It is important to note
that the court’s analysis thus far was based upon U.S. law—i.e.,
whether a U.S. court would enforce the judgment. The court still had
to make a final jump from why the judgment was unenforceable in
the United States to asserting that it had the power to bind the
judgment-creditors from trying to enforce that judgment outside the
United States. The Donzinger court noted that because equity acts in
personam, the court could issue an injunction barring the LAPs from
enforcing the judgment anywhere in the world without making a
determination on another court’s sovereignty.184 In other words, the
district court in Donziger could bind the LAPs without freezing the
ability of a foreign court system to hear an enforcement proceeding
because the court had personal jurisdiction over all of the parties.
Granting the injunction would certainly cause some friction
between nations, the court acknowledged, but “[w]hen a sovereign
country renders a judgment and parties attempt to enforce that
judgment abroad, the fact that the judgment and the forum in which it
was rendered are open to attack in the forum where enforcement is

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id.
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sought is inherent in the international scheme.”185 The LAPs sought
to benefit from seeking enforcement in multiple countries,
presumably to force Chevron into a quick settlement.186 “In this
circumstance, there is no better remedy because the alternative is
litigation all over the world, deciding enforceability jurisdiction by
jurisdiction,” and the evidence raised substantial doubt about the
fairness of the proceedings in Ecuador.187
After the Donzinger court established that Chevron would likely
be able to establish personal jurisdiction over the LAPs,188 it finally
turned the propriety of issuing an injunction against the LAPs from
trying to enforce the judgment in foreign jurisdictions while the
underlying merits of the case were being tried in the Southern District
of New York.189 The court concluded that the factors articulated in
China Trade provided the proper standard for determining whether
the injunction should be granted.190 China Trade has two threshold
requirements: 1) the parties in the litigation are the same, and 2)
resolution of the case before the enjoining court should be dispositive
of the actions to be enjoined in the foreign forum.191 If those
conditions are met, then the court considers five factors in
determining whether to issue an injunction:
1) the frustration of a policy in the enjoining forum; 2) [whether] the
foreign action would be vexatious; 3) [any] threat to the issuing
court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; 4) [whether] the
proceedings in the other forum prejudice other equitable
considerations; or 5) [whether] adjudication of the same issues in
separate actions would result in delay, inconvenience, expense,
inconsistency, or a race to judgment.192

The court determined that the first two threshold requirements
were met, and that the second, fourth, and fifth factors all weighed in
favor of an injunction.193 It appears that the district court addressed

185. Id. The court also noted that they were not interfering with Ecuador’s
adjudication of the underlying dispute or the judgment’s enforceability in Ecuador.
Id. at 638 n.323.
186. Id. at 629, 638.
187. Id. at 638.
188. See id. at 639–45.
189. Id. at 646.
190. See id. (citing China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33
(2d. Cir. 1987)).
191. See China Trade, 937 F.2d at 36.
192. Id. at 35 (quoting Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 603 F. Supp.
636, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
193. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
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every possible legal standard that could have applied to deciding
whether to grant anti-“enforcement” actions such as these, which is
why the Donziger opinion, as well as the Second Circuit opinion
(which is discussed in the next section) are so interesting—and also
troublesome.
B.

The Naranjo Decision

The Second Circuit was probably horrified when the worldwide
anti-enforcement injunction came up on appeal. In reversing the
district court from a unanimous bench, Judge Lynch first discussed
the standards for review of a preliminary injunction.194 The opinion
stated that a court of appeals must reverse a district court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction when there has been an abuse of discretion, or
if the district court proceeded on the basis of an erroneous
interpretation of the law.195 Thus, a district court, by applying the
wrong standard, will have committed an abuse of discretion.196 The
Second Circuit found that Chevron, and the district court, based the
anti-enforcement injunction on New York’s codification of the
Recognition Act.197 The Second Circuit concluded that reliance on
the Recognition Act was improper, stating that:
Whatever the merits of Chevron’s complaints about the
Ecuadorian courts, however, the procedural device it has chosen to
present those claims is simply unavoidable: The Recognition Act
nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign judgment
unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgmentdebtor . . . .The sections on which Chevron relies provide exceptions
from the circumstances in which a holder of a foreign judgment can
obtain enforcement of that judgment in New York; they do not
create an affirmative cause of action to declare foreign judgments
void and enjoin their enforcement.198

The Second Circuit also asserted that the Recognition Act was
meant “to provide for the enforcement of judgments, not to prevent
them.”199 The point of the Act, after all, was to facilitate trust
between nations.200

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 2012).
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239 (2d Cir. 2012).

Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id.
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As a result, the Second Circuit focused a great deal on comity
considerations, stating that issuing such an injunction would violate
international comity. New York should not serve as “a transnational
arbiter” to decide which judgments should be respected and which
ones should not.201 The court went on to say that even though both
sides called this injunction an anti-suit injunction, China Trade’s antisuit injunction balancing test had “limited relevance” because the
injunction here was an anti-enforcement injunction.202 Chevron was
preemptively trying to declare the judgment unenforceable before the
LAPs tried to enforce it in the Second Circuit, and therefore China
Trade should not have governed the claim.203
The court then returned to the principle of international comity.
Judge Lynch asserted that “when a court in one country attempts to
preclude the courts of every other nation from ever considering the
effect of that foreign judgment, the comity concerns become far
graver.”204 Indeed, it was a “weighty matter” for one judicial system
to declare another country’s judicial system unfair and corrupt.205 The
Donzinger court did not discuss the legal rules that would prevent the
LAPs from enforcing somewhere else.206 Moreover, nothing in the
Recognition Act allowed a court to enjoin a judgment-creditor from
enforcing a judgment that was granted in a foreign forum in another
foreign forum.207
Finally, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of declaratory
judgment. Chevron had also tried to characterize the injunction as a
simple declaratory judgment under the DJA (confusingly, they had
tried to argue that the injunction was pursuant to both the DJA and
China Trade), and by doing so, had “implicitly acknowledge[d] the
Recognition Act’s limitations . . . .”208 Although district courts have
discretion to declare legal rights and relations, that discretion must
rely on a valid legal predicate.209 The court pointed out that like the
Recognition Act, the DJA is “procedural only,” 210 and “does not

201. Id. at 242.
202. Id. at 243.
203. China Trade is limited only to situations where parties try to litigate the same
suit in multiple (foreign) jurisdictions. Id.
204. Id. at 244.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671
(1950)).
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create an independent cause of action.”211 Because the Recognition
Act could not provide a valid legal predicate, the DJA was not
available to Chevron as a procedural tool.212 Further, while the cases
referring to the Recognition Act and the DJA together were limited,
none allowed the DJA to be used to declare the unenforceability of a
judgment before the judgment-creditor sought to enforce it.213
The court also referred to Basic v. Fitzroy Engineering, Ltd.214 In
Basic, a judgment-debtor requested declaratory relief (under the
DJA) that a foreign judgment was unenforceable.215 The court there
instructed the plaintiff to pursue an “obvious alternative remedy”216:
wait until the putative judgment-creditor brought an enforcement
action under the relevant state’s version of the Recognition act, and
raise applicable defenses at that time.217
The Naranjo court,
influenced by the Northern District of Illinois’ analysis in Basic, found
that the Dow Jones test was of limited relevance, just like China

Trade.218
The Second Circuit thus concluded that a “better remedy” was
indeed available: Chevron could wait until the plaintiffs tried to
enforce the action in the United States, and then assert its defenses
under the Recognition Act.219 After all, there was no specific
indication that the LAPs, although they had indicated an intention to
enforce the judgment, would choose New York as the place to do so.
C.

Shell Oil

The Second Circuit, in conducting its analysis, distinguished the
facts in Chevron from Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, a case that allowed for
a preemptive declaration under the Recognition Act by a judgmentdebtor.220 Shell Oil is the closest comparable case to the ChevronEcuador litigation—it even involves an oil company and some rogue

211. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007)).
212. Id. at 245.
213. Id. at 245.
214. 949 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
215. Id. at 1341.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 245. Even though the DJA was held unavailable, the
Second Circuit still engaged in the Dow Jones analysis and concluded that such an
injunction would not finalize the issue on enforceability in anywhere except New
York. Id. at 246.
219. Id. at 246.
220. Shell Oil Co. v. Franco (Shell Oil II), No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWx), 2005 WL
6184247 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).
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Central American plaintiffs. In Shell Oil, a group of Nicaraguan
plaintiffs had obtained a judgment in Nicaragua for exposure to
DBCP, a nematocide used to control infestation of crops.221 The
plaintiffs filed suit in Nicaragua for damages from exposure to
DBCP.222 The Nicaraguan claimants (Claimants) obtained a $489.4
million judgment against four companies, one of which was Shell
Oil.223 The Claimants tried to enforce the judgment in the Central
District of California against all four defendants.224 The Claimants
accidentally, however, named “Shell Chemical Company” as a
defendant instead of Shell Oil Company, which the Claimants
conceded and dismissed on appeal.225 Shell Oil then filed an action
for declaratory relief in the Central District of California, seeking a
declaration that the Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable.226
The California district court first addressed whether Shell Oil’s
action was ripe. In determining ripeness, the court concluded that
there was a substantial controversy between the parties.227 The
Claimants had obtained a multimillion-dollar judgment against Shell
Oil in Nicaragua, and had made it clear that they were going to
enforce the judgment from their initial attempt to do so in the same
jurisdiction.228 There was every reason to believe that they would
attempt to enforce the judgment now that they had realized their
mistake.229
Next, the court analyzed whether the Nicaraguan
The district court
judgment was enforceable in California.230
concluded that, under California’s codification of the Recognition Act
and relevant standards for summary judgment, the Nicaraguan court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Shell Oil (one of the grounds for
non-recognition)231 and there was no genuine issue of material fact
remaining to be decided.232 Thus, a declaratory judgment that the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *13.
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Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable in the United States was
proper.233
The Second Circuit, however, distinguished Shell Oil because
unlike the Nicaraguan Claimants, the LAPs had not yet tried to
enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in New York. Despite some
ambiguity in the California district court’s reasoning, the Second
Circuit stated “to the extent that Shell [Oil] stands for the proposition
that the Recognition Act can be used by judgment-debtors as a
procedural lever to seek affirmative invalidation of foreign judgments
before their enforcement is sought, we decline to follow it.”234
D. Ripeness and Libel Tourism
While the Central District of California in Shell Oil considered
whether a money judgment-debtor could bring an affirmative action
in the United States before the judgment-creditor had technically
tried to enforce the judgment,235 the Ninth Circuit examined the
ripeness issue with regard to non-money judgments. In Yahoo! Inc.
v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! III), eight
judges out of a divided en banc court discussed a preemptive suit for
non-enforceability under the First Amendment of a French court’s
judgment.236 The underlying action involved the organizations La
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (LICRA) and L’Union
des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF), which sued Yahoo!, an
Internet service provider, for making available to French citizens
various websites selling Nazi paraphernalia and displaying Nazi
symbols in violation of French law.237 The French court issued an
interim order, requiring Yahoo! to take the websites down or block
French access to those sites.238 Yahoo! objected, and responded that
there was no technical solution to that order.239 The company filed
suit against LICRA in California federal district court, seeking a
declaration that the interim orders were not recognizable or
enforceable in the United States.240 The district court held that it had

233. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1713.4(a)(2) (repealed 2007);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987)).
234. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 2012).
235. Shell Oil II, 2005 WL 6184247, at *4.
236. 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
237. Id. at 1202.
238. Id. at 1202–03.
239. Id. at 1203.
240. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! I), 145
F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF, denying their motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.241 Several months later, in
another “thoughtful opinion,” as described by the Ninth Circuit,242 the
district court concluded that the suit was ripe, that abstention was not
warranted, and that “the First Amendment precludes enforcement
within the United States.”243
In an incredibly fractured en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit
majority reversed the district court. The majority found that the
district court did have personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF.244
Of that majority, three judges wanted to dismiss the case for lack of
ripeness, and five judges concluded that the case was ripe for
adjudication under the requirements articulated in Abbott
Laboratories.245 In applying the two-part Abbott Laboratories test,
the three judges who wished to dismiss the case for lack of ripeness
looked at the precise legal question to be answered in applying the
fitness for judicial resolution prong from Abbott Laboratories, as well
as the factual record.246 They concluded that there was no federal
statute on the recognition of foreign-country judgments, and that
California’s version of the Recognition Act did not cover
injunctions.247
Thus, the judges felt compelled to consider
international comity, and the general principle followed by California
courts that an American court will not enforce a foreign judgment if
that judgment is “repugnant to the public policy of the United
States . . . .”248
It was difficult to tell, however, whether the French judgment
would be repugnant to the public policy of the United States—adding
to the prematurity and speculative nature of the suit. The three
judges further noted that it was unclear whether, or exactly how,
Yahoo! had complied with the French court’s orders, which would be
highly relevant to whether enforcement of the judgment would be

241.
242.
243.
169 F.

Id. at 1180.
See Yahoo! III, 433 F.3d at 1204 (en banc).

Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! II),
Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), on
reh’g en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d and remanded, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th
Cir. 2006).
244. Yahoo! III, 433 F.3d at 1201.
245. Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
246. Id. at 1212.
247. Id. at 1212–13.
248. Id. (noting that California courts routinely cite RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) (1987)).
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repugnant to public policy.249 “Without a finding that further
compliance with the French court’s orders would necessarily result in
restrictions on access by users in the United States,” the court
reasoned, “the only question in this case is whether California public
policy and the First Amendment require unrestricted access by
Internet users in France. In other words, the only question would
involve a determination of whether the First Amendment has
extraterritorial application,”250 the extent of which was very unclear.
Thus, the question was not fit for judicial resolution.
Turning to the hardship of the parties, the three judges concluded
that “[t]he core of Yahoo!’s hardship argument may thus be that it
has a First Amendment interest in allowing access by users in
France.”251 However, as was discussed in the fitness for judicial
resolution prong, the existence of a right to extraterritorially apply
U.S. constitutional rights to free speech was not clear. The judges
found that because it was incredibly unlikely that any monetary
penalty could actually be enforced against Yahoo!, and because the
extent to which Yahoo! would have to restrict American users was
quite speculative, the level of harm was not sufficient to render the
suit ripe.252
The Yahoo! III court eventually decided to dismiss the case, even
though the opinion addressing the ripeness issue was written by just
three judges.253 Indeed, “[w]hen the votes of the three judges who
conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with the votes of the
three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal
jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss
Yahoo!’s suit.”254 Still, the question remains whether Chevron’s suit
and its request for an anti-enforcement injunction should have been
analyzed within the context of the two-part Abbott Labs test.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Second Circuit’s decision in Naranjo still leaves some
unanswered questions and unsettled law. As a case study, it is a
wonderful example of the complexities and ironies that accompany
international litigation. But for practitioners, it creates a number of

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
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procedural hurdles to overcome when combating aggressive
multinational enforcement proceedings.
Practically speaking, it is clear that even if the LAPs tried to
enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in the United States, it would
probably be unenforceable in any state that has codified a version of
the Recognition Act.255 The Guerra report states that the LAPs’
attorneys ghostwrote the Ecuadorian court’s multibillion-dollar
judgment.256 It has been suggested that transnational tort cases in
particular are susceptible to litigation impropriety,257 and the
Chevron-Ecuador litigation is a good illustration of that observation.
Chevron was asking for an unusual injunction. Indeed, the
Naranjo and Donziger opinions indicate that the courts in those cases
were not sure how to address the issue because they applied multiple
legal analyses: the DJA,258 the Recognition Act, and the applicable
standards in New York for granting anti-suit injunctions.259
Moreover, other cases evaluating preemptive suits for nonenforcement have addressed whether the action is ripe pursuant to
Article III of the federal Constitution—mostly in the context of libel
tourism.260 The various problems with the Second Circuit’s decision in
Naranjo and the Southern District of New York’s in Donziger (Parts
IV.A and IV.B) are discussed in turn. Part IV.C discusses whether a
ripeness analysis is relevant, and if so, whether that conclusion has
any bearing on the underlying problem of aggressive multinational
enforcement proceedings. Part IV.D discusses alternative approaches
255. The judgment would probably fall in the “does not provide improper
tribunals” and “obtained by fraud” categories of the Recognition Act, which would
render the judgment as not conclusive and unrecognizable. See RECOGNITION ACT,
supra note 8, § 4(a)(1), (b)(1). New York’s codification of the Recognition Act
provides the same grounds for non-recognition. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a)(1),
(b)(3) (McKinney 1997).
256. See Bastidas, supra note 80.
257. Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally:
Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 456, 457–58 (2011).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
259. China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
For further discussion of the standards for granting anti-suit injunctions in New York,
see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 646–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir.
Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
260. See, e.g., Yahoo! III, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the
court had personal jurisdiction over an Internet service provider’s suit for declaration
that a French order to block French access to certain websites was unenforceable in
the United States, with eight of the en banc judges addressing whether the action was
ripe).
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and proposes a solution that would involve crafting a new injunction
using a modified anti-suit injunction analysis.
A. Problems with the Naranjo Decision
The Second Circuit’s decision that courts should dismiss a motion
for a preliminary anti-enforcement injunction because the
Recognition Act applies—and not the standards for granting anti-suit
injunctions—is problematic from both a legal and policy standpoint.
The Naranjo court held that N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 53 (New York’s
version of the Recognition Act) was unavailable to Chevron due to a
procedural restriction: Article 53 provides defenses to recognition and
cannot act as an affirmative cause of action.261 Assuming the Second
Circuit was correct, China Trade is indeed of “limited relevance.”262
Instead, the Recognition Act applies, but cannot provide a basis for
non-liability standing alone.263
Although the Second Circuit was able to shed some light on how to
interpret the Recognition Act—at least within the Second Circuit, if
not other Circuits—the opinion poses several problems as a matter of
law and policy. The Naranjo decision provides judgment-creditors
who have potentially unfair judgments in hand with a roadmap,
telling them precisely what to do if they want to enforce a judgment
that would not pass muster in the United States. To make sure the
judgment-debtor has no remedy from defending in multiple fora,
judgment-creditors must simply avoid the United States, and proceed
in countries where the defendant has assets and the local justice
system would be less squeamish about recognizing a questionable
award. This roadmap effectively leads to a form of harassment,
creating the kind of vexatious proceedings that the anti-suit injunction
standards arguably exist to prevent.264 It is a strange case where the

261. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
5304 (McKinney 1997), construed in David D. Siegel, Supplementary Practice
Commentaries: CPLR 5303:1. Recognition and Procedure for Enforcement, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5303 (McKinney Supp. 2013).
262. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 243.
263. See id. at 240 (“Whatever the merits of Chevron’s complaints about the
Ecuadorian courts, however, the procedural device it has chosen to present those
claims is simply unavailable: The Recognition Act nowhere authorizes a court to
declare a foreign judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative
judgment-debtor.”).
264. See Treviño de Coale, supra note 131, at 86 (“‘[T]he magnitude of the
undesirable effects of parallel litigation,’ such as the cost, duplication and unfairness
of requiring a party to litigate in an unfamiliar forum, have persuaded U.S. courts to
restrict parallel litigation through the doctrines of forum non conveniens,
international comity, and lis alibi pendens, and antisuit injunctions.”(footnotes
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China Trade factors seem like they should apply, but do not because
there is not yet an enforcement proceeding in the United States.
Although the factors for granting anti-suit injunctions seem to
mirror Chevron’s situation, the Second Circuit was probably right
that China Trade and its progeny were of limited relevance. The very
wording of the China Trade test indicates that it applies only to
parallel proceedings—i.e., to multiple proceedings that have already
begun.265 Here, when the injunction was originally sought, the LAPs
had not commenced any enforcement proceedings (they merely
threatened to begin them).266 Moreover, a threshold requirement of
China Trade requires that resolution of the case in the enjoining
forum would be dispositive of the actions enjoined in the foreign
forum.267 Is New York judgment recognition law dispositive of
proceedings in Canada, for example? Or Argentina? The answer is
most likely no.
Another question raised by the Naranjo opinion is whether the
picture changed after enforcement proceedings commenced in other
countries. Would the Second Circuit have affirmed the district court’s
injunction in Donziger if the proceedings in Brazil or Canada or
Argentina had already begun when the district court issued its
opinion? The answer, arguably, is that while it may have had some
bearing on the Second Circuit’s decision in Naranjo (which is
unlikely, considering how concerned the Second Circuit was about
international comity), it would not have made any difference to the
overarching problem discussed in this Note. Particularly because the
Second Circuit’s solution for Chevron was to wait to assert the
Recognition Act’s defenses for when the judgment-creditor brought
an enforcement proceeding in the United States, the fact that
proceedings had begun in another country makes no difference. An
enforcement proceeding still has not occurred in the United States,
and therefore the Recognition Act provides no relief. In future cases,

omitted) (quoting Yoshimasa Furuta, International Parallel Litigation: Disposition of
Duplicative Civil Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y
J. 1, 9 (1995))).
265. See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d. Cir.
1987) (requiring that, among other things, the parties in the other forum be identical,
and that the foreign proceedings are vexatious, assuming that there is another
proceeding that has already begun).
266. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir.
Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
267. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
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the judgment-debtor will still be forced to defend in multiple
countries and hope that some kind of enforcement proceeding will be
filed in the United States, allowing the judgment-debtor to utilize the
Recognition Act’s defenses.
Nevertheless, these issues do not mean that China Trade is
completely irrelevant. The LAPs have tried to bring identical
enforcement proceedings in multiple fora outside the United States.268
The proceedings are oppressive and vexatious. The situation looks
like something that should be evaluated under China Trade, but it
technically cannot apply because there is no parallel proceeding in the
United States. Even at the time Naranjo was decided, none of the
enforcement actions had begun. Chevron was still appealing the
judgment in Ecuador, although the LAPs were planning on trying to
enforce the judgment in multiple fora before those proceedings were
complete.269
The issue of the DJA is slightly more nuanced. Shell Oil, which
was discussed in Naranjo, involved a declaration of non-enforceability
within the United States. In issuing declaratory judgment, the court
in Shell Oil determined that a Nicaraguan judgment would be
unenforceable in the United States because it was unenforceable
under California’s version of the Recognition Act.270 Thus, the DJA
could have at least provided a remedy within the United States.
Parties bring declarations of non-liability all the time, and there is no
reason why the district court could not have declared the judgment
unenforceable in the United States, like the court did in Shell Oil.
The court in Donziger, however, was deciding not whether to grant a
motion for declaratory judgment, but rather, whether to issue a
preliminary anti-enforcement injunction.271 The opinion was unclear
about what standard applied because such an injunction had never
been issued before. Regardless, looking to the Recognition Act in
determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment worldwide is not
a proper remedy, because U.S. law cannot determine a judgment’s
enforceability in another country’s legal system without violating
international comity.272
268. See sources cited supra note 79.
269. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594. One of the LAPs’ principal lawyers
stated, “[W]e’re coming back immediately, as soon as we can, to get that judgment
enforced. We are not waiting for the appeals process, as is our right.” Id. at 594 n.4.
270. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1717 (West 2007); see Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No.
CV 03-8846 NM (PJWX), 2005 WL 6184247, at *13, (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).
271. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594–95.
272. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 242–43 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Nothing
in the language, history, or purposes of the [Recognition] Act suggests that it creates
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Problems with the Donziger Decision

The Donziger opinion presents a set of problems separate from the
Naranjo opinion as a matter of both law and policy. Legally speaking,
although the Donziger court raised a number of good arguments for
why the harm would be irreparable and why the foreign proceedings
were vexatious, it simply lacked the procedural device with which to
attach the injunction. As mentioned previously, the Second Circuit
was probably correct that the Recognition Act, on its own, cannot
provide a basis for non-liability.273 The anti-suit injunction test is only
applicable to existing parallel proceedings.
The DJA, however, is an equally unsatisfying solution for a
judgment-debtor in Chevron’s position. The DJA is procedural only,
and as with the Recognition Act, courts must reference substantive
law when issuing a declaratory judgment.274 The district court in
Donziger was essentially grasping for a procedural hook that it felt
must exist, but instead found a variety of arguments that were all
insufficient.
Although courts should be able to issue declaratory judgments on
enforceability within the United States, it is unlikely that a court
would be able to declare a foreign judgment unenforceable anywhere
in the world.275 Nevertheless, the reason the judge in Donziger had no
qualms with issuing an anti-enforcement injunction as far as comity
was concerned was because the injunction was binding on the parties,
and not foreign court systems.276 It was also a preliminary injunction,
meant to stop the LAPs from enforcing the judgment until a trial on
the merits could be held.277 The injunction was not necessarily
intended to be a permanent one, declaring that the entire world must
adhere to U.S. judgment recognition law. There was substantial
evidence of fraudulent proceedings in Ecuador and evidence that the
LAPs had manipulated those proceedings.278 Perhaps the Second

causes of action by which disappointed litigants in foreign cases can ask a New York
court to . . . preempt the courts of other countries from making their own decisions
about the enforceability of such judgments.”).
273. See supra Part IV.A.
274. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
275. International comity likely prevents directing foreign court systems’
judgments, as noted in the Naranjo opinion. See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 242; supra Part
II.A.
276. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (“Indeed, since equity acts in personam,
the Court may issue an injunction barring all of the defendants from filing
enforcement proceedings in other jurisdictions.”).
277. Id. at 594.
278. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
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Circuit was understating its ability to do anything for Chevron—but
again, if the procedural device does not exist, no amount of policy will
help a judgment-debtor.
Another potential issue with the Donziger decision is the
possibility that such an injunction is too protective of U.S. litigants.
What interest does the Southern District of New York have in
preventing Chevron from being forced to litigate all over the world,
other than the fact that Chevron is based in the United States?
Would this be a form of protective jurisdiction? Although anti-suit
injunctions, for example, are already a form of protective judicial
procedures,279 it is arguably not a U.S. court’s responsibility to protect
judgment-debtors like Chevron from abusive multinational
litigation—unless the judgment contradicts a strongly-held public
policy of the forum. Perhaps defending in multiple fora is simply the
price a large company pays for doing business in countries where
notions of constitutionally required due process do not necessarily
exist. That argument, combined with the international comity
concerns (the idea that issuing such an injunction would fail to accord
the respect that a foreign court system deserves280), makes the
feasibility of such an injunction look very weak.
C.

The Ripeness Analysis

As far as ripeness goes, even if ripeness is what courts should be
evaluating, then the Recognition Act/China Trade/DJA discussion is
still pertinent. The court in Yahoo! III281 noted that when reviewing
the first prong of the Abbott Labs test, courts generally look to both
the facts of the case and the substantive legal issue at hand.282
Whether a court may attach an anti-enforcement injunction to the
Recognition Act certainly speaks to the question of whether the issue
is fit for judicial resolution, which essentially leads us down the same
road travelled by the court in Naranjo. If the Recognition Act is
unavailable as a procedural remedy to justify an anti-enforcement
injunction, then the action cannot be fit for judicial resolution until
the judgment-creditors have tried to enforce the judgment in the

279. See Daniel Tan, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45
VA. J. INT’L L. 283, 320 (2005) (“Enjoining unrelated foreign proceedings that
adversely affect national policies or the jurisdiction of the court may be analyzed as
an aspect of the court’s well-established jurisdiction to issue ‘protective’ anti-suit
injunctions.”).
280. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text on Hilton v. Guyot.
281. 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
282. Id. at 1212.
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United States. In effect, the circle comes back to the problems and
questions raised by the Naranjo decision discussed in Part IV.A.
Thus, addressing the ripeness question does not lead to any real, final
conclusions for the purposes of this Note’s overarching question.
Instead, adding a ripeness layer to the inquiry will merely add to the
procedural difficulties a litigant will face when requesting an antienforcement injunction.
D. So, What is the Remedy?
The question now, of course (after the various arguments used in

Donziger and Naranjo have been ruled out), is how can the problem
be solved? What tools are left for a court to use when a judgmentdebtor is faced with multiple proceedings in different countries to
enforce an allegedly unfair foreign judgment?
A principal problem in international litigation is the lack of a set
standard for cases such as these. Chevron was certainly asking for
something unusual. As the Second Circuit noted, Shell Oil was the
closest comparison, and in Shell Oil the motion for declaratory
judgment was granted primarily because the judgment-creditors
previously tried to enforce the judgment, but had named the wrong
defendant.283 The Naranjo opinion is also the only opinion that refers
to the legality of an “anti-enforcement injunction” in this situation.284
Nonetheless, the fact that the courts in Donziger and Naranjo refer to
multiple lines of legal analysis in their struggle to find an answer to
this problem indicates how complicated international litigation
proceedings can be.
International law, as a general matter, does not provide any
remedy for abusive enforcement proceedings either. The United
States is not subject to any treaty on recognition of judgments,285 and
thus no law exists (at least, no law that is binding in the United States)
on multiple enforcement proceedings and whether they can be
stopped or consolidated in some way. There the anti-suit injunction
standards present additional issues. The conservative side of the antisuit injunction Circuit split requires that parallel proceedings should

283. See generally Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWX), 2005 WL
6184247 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).
284. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (referring to
the injunction as an anti-enforcement injunction). But cf. Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v.
Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (referring to an “anti-enforcement
injunction” issued by the Supreme Court of Belize), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 274
(2012).
285. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.

308

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

generally be allowed to continue,286 which arguably leads to a “race to
judgment.”287 Perhaps the anti-suit injunction standards are no longer
helpful in a world where parallel proceedings are common and every
international dispute is consumed with a plethora of procedural
issues.
As a policy matter (and pointing to the political undertones of the
Chevron-Ecuador litigation), there are certainly plenty of academics
and environmental groups who support the LAPs’ cause.288 Aside
from anger at the allegations of environmental damage, some
organizations have gone so far as to say that the damage in Ecuador
rises to the level of human rights abuses.289 On the other hand, this
particular method of retribution for Chevron’s alleged wrongdoing is
a bit unconventional. The LAPs’ allegations deal with land and
environmental abuses, implying that the ROE should be bringing this
action against Chevron (if Chevron should be held liable). Notably,
the ROE had already settled claims with Texaco before Chevron’s

286. See Laker Airways Ltd. V. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
926–27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the general rule on the conservative side of the
Circuit split is to allow parallel proceedings “on the same in personam claim” to
“proceed simultaneously, at least until judgment is reached in one which can be pled
as res judicata in the other”).
287. Vertigan, supra note 130, at 173.
288. See Lauren McCaskill, When Oil Attacks: Litigation Options for Nigerian
Plaintiffs in U.S. Federal Courts, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 535 (2013) (describing the
damage the oil companies have done and examining litigation options available to
Nigerian plaintiffs by comparing the Chevron-Ecuador events to events in the Niger
Delta and speculating on how Chevron might defend against Nigerians, suggesting a
common law tort action against Chevron); Patel, supra note 172 (summarizing the
Texaco/TexPet/Chevron story up until the Second Circuit proceedings in Naranjo,
emphasizing “the problem of shoddy environmental performance in oil exploitation”
and asserting that the Aguinda cases provide a “strong incentive” for corporations
not to engage in those exploitations); Amazon Watch Campaign, CHEVRONTOXICO,
http://chevrontoxico.com/about/amazon-watch-campaign/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013)
(AmazonWatch is a nonprofit organization that seeks to “protect the rainforests and
the indigenous peoples in the Amazon Basin,” and it has launched a “Clean Up
Ecuador Campaign.”); About Us, AMAZONWATCH, http://amazonwatch.org/about
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013). For a website detailing the Clean Up Ecuador Campaign’s
goals and tactics, see Amazon Watch Campaign, CHEVRONTOXICO, http://
chevrontoxico.com/about/amazon-watch-campaign/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). The
team suing Chevron also maintains a blog, which links the reader to various nonprofit
groups that presumably have supported its actions in the past, and invites its readers
to follow the blog on various social networking sites. See CHEVRON PIT,
http://thechevronpit.blogspot.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
289. See Chevron Pollution and Three Decades of Neglect, AMNESTY INT’L,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights/chevronpollution-and-three-decades-of-neglect (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
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involvement.290 Thus, the situation raises the additional underlying
question of whether attorneys like Steven Donziger (particularly in
light of Alberto Guerra’s sworn affidavit291) are taking advantage of
litigants like the LAPs, using the cloak of moral justice to hopefully
obtain a contingency fee at the end of the road.292 Should lawyers be
allowed to use multiple enforcement proceedings in this way?
Both practically and procedurally, the DJA, China Trade, and the
Recognition Act are all insufficient, standing alone, to provide some a
remedy for aggressive multinational proceedings to enforce an
apparently unfair judgment. Each argument has its own weaknesses,
which is probably why Chevron attempted to make all of them, and
why the Second Circuit was able to dismiss each in turn. But, as
unique as the Chevron-Ecuador litigation may be, in a world of
increasing multinational litigation, aggressive and almost harassing
enforcement proceedings are not likely to disappear. So what can
litigants and courts do besides spend a great deal of time talking
about international comity? After all, courts on both sides of the
anti-suit injunction split agree that “comity” is an “elusive concept”
and not easily defined.293 It is simple enough to talk about the respect
a court should accord to the legal systems of a foreign nation, but it is
quite another task (and a much more difficult one) for courts to
articulate a clear standard when actually applying comity to the facts
of a specific case.294
To name one attempted solution, judgment-debtors who feel
victimized by an unfair judgment could do what Chevron tried to do
in a later action, which was to find a way to obtain specific jurisdiction
over each judgment-creditor individually, and bring all of the parties
together in a single suit.295 Then, the court could find something to
which to attach an injunction. In Chevron’s case, Chevron could use
the claims brought under RICO, arguing for the injunction based on a

290. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated
sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir.
Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). Texaco was actually the
original defendant in this litigation before Chevron acquired all of Texaco’s shares.
See id. at 594.
291. See Bastidas, supra note 80.
292. Donziger is the lead attorney for the LAPs. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at
594 (noting that Chevron claimed that the judgment in Ecuador “was obtained by
fraud led in major degree by a New York City lawyer, Steven Donziger”).
293. Heiser, supra note 2, at 860.
294. Id. at 860; see also Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir.
2004) (referring to comity as “a protean concept of jurisdictional respect”).
295. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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common law theory of unjust enrichment—and Chevron has actually
tried to make this argument.296 The unjust enrichment claim was
deemed unripe, however, because the judgment-creditors had not yet
collected on the judgment anywhere inside or outside the United
States.297 Under New York law, a judgment does not create any
vested property interest.298 Thus, one remedy (albeit an unpalatable
one) would have been to wait until the LAPs collected part of the
judgment in another forum, and then enjoin them from collecting the
rest. That “remedy,” however, would still require Chevron to appear
and defend in those jurisdictions, so it does not solve the overarching
problem put forth in this Note. Chevron would also have to deliver
part of the judgment, which would only be recovered if the district
court awarded damages for the unjust enrichment claim.
The best solution is to create a new standard—but not one
completely unknown. The federal Circuits should fashion a new type
of injunction based on the China Trade factors, requiring that the
U.S. court have personal jurisdiction over all of the parties through an
underlying claim, such as in the RICO action mentioned above.
Academics have suggested that anti-suit injunctions should be issued
when the foreign action is interdictory in nature,299 which certainly
applies here, so it makes sense to adopt a modified China Trade test
to anti-enforcement injunctions, particularly when abuse of
enforcement proceedings appear imminent.

296. See id. In that action (not to be confused with the preliminary injunction
action of the same name), Chevron’s claims included:
[A]ssertions that Steven Donziger, a New York lawyer, and others based in
the United States, here conceived, substantially executed, largely funded,
and significantly directed a scheme to extort and defraud Chevron, a U.S.
company, by, among other things, (1) bringing a baseless lawsuit in
Ecuador; (2) fabricating (principally in the United States) evidence for use
in that lawsuit in order to obtain an unwarranted judgment there; (3)
exerting pressure on Chevron to coerce it to pay money not only by means
of the Ecuadorian litigation and Judgment, but also by subjecting Chevron
to public attacks in the United States and elsewhere based on false and
misleading statements, (4) inducing U.S. public officials to investigate
Chevron on the basis of false claims, and (5) making false statements to U.S.
courts and intimidating and tampering with witnesses in U.S. court
proceedings to prevent Chevron from obtaining evidence of the fraud.
Id. at 236–37. Chevron’s complaint stated nine causes of action, including substantive
and conspiracy claims under RICO, common law tort claims, unjust enrichment, and
state law civil conspiracy claims. Id. at 237.
297. Id. at 259.
298. See id. at 259–60 (citing In re Calloway, 423 B.R. 627, 629–30 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2010)).
299. See generally Heiser, supra note 2 (also arguing that anti-suit injunctions
should be granted to enforce choice of court agreements).
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When deciding whether to grant an anti-enforcement injunction
(notwithstanding whether enforcement proceedings have begun in the
United States), courts should, as a threshold matter, determine (1)
whether personal jurisdiction exists over all the parties, and (2)
whether the U.S. court has a substantial interest in resolving the
dispute. The second threshold prong will exist to prevent courts from
issuing anti-enforcement injunctions when the United States has little
or nothing to do with the case. In the Chevron-Ecuador litigation, for
example, the Southern District of New York served as the forum for
an earlier tort action brought by the LAPs (then called the “Aguinda
plaintiffs”) that was dismissed for forum non conveniens.300 More
importantly, the Southern District of New York was also the forum
for the underlying RICO action to which the court in Donziger sought
to attach the anti-enforcement injunction.301 To satisfy the second
threshold requirement, the litigation as a whole must therefore have
some contact with the United States. Mere fortuitous jurisdiction
over the parties (if the LAPs happened to be domiciled in New York)
is not enough. The injunction also may not be attached to a separate
and completely unrelated suit.
Next, if both threshold prongs are met, courts should consider
whether (a) the enforcement proceedings are likely to occur or have
occurred already, (b) the judgment would be unenforceable in the
United States based on U.S. recognition law, (c) the judgment-debtor
would suffer irreparable harm from those proceedings, and (d) the
multi-forum enforcement proceedings violate public policy. Naturally
the factors are likely to overlap, and the circumstances in which such
a test is likely to be applied are quite narrow. However, the
narrowness of this test should hopefully assuage the concerns of those
who are already uncomfortable with issuing anti-suit injunctions.
CONCLUSION: THE AFTERMATH OF NARANJO
Since the Guerra affidavit was released, the LAPs’ case has
become essentially worthless to Donziger. Chevron has sued various
persons and entities associated with the LAPs’ case, including Patton

300. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as
modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
301. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV(L), 2011 WL 4375022
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo,
667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
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Boggs, L.L.P., a large law firm based in Washington, D.C.302 Patton
Boggs had joined Donziger in the suit against Chevron on a partial
contingency basis in 2010.303 Chevron’s specific claim against Patton
Boggs is for fraud and malicious prosecution during the course of the
litigation.304
Chevron has also convinced multiple parties to renounce Donziger
and “admit” that the proceedings in Ecuador were fraudulent in
exchange for being dropped from Chevron’s RICO suit.305 Even
before Chevron sued Patton Boggs, Buford Capital—the publicly
traded fund that financed Patton Boggs’ representation—stated that
Patton Boggs had given them a misleading analysis of the case.306
Stratus Consulting (the company Donziger hired to comment on the
expert report in Ecuador) has recanted its scientific findings and
conclusions in exchange for being dropped from the racketeering suit
as well.307 Finally, a Canadian court has dismissed one of the LAPs’
enforcement actions, mostly because Chevron has no assets in
Ontario.308
Again, plenty of environmentalists and academics would like to see
Chevron pay for its wrongdoing in the Amazon, regardless of the
lengths taken to achieve that payment. The litigation, however, has
become entirely unmanageable. Multiple firms on the case have
asked to withdraw, and one such firm has noted poetically that due to
Chevron’s army of lawyers, the case has “degenerated into a
Dickensian farce.”309

302. See Steve LeVine, One of the Nastiest Fights in Big Oil Just Got Nastier,
QUARTZ (May 10, 2013), http://qz.com/83402/chevron-ecuador-fight-with-pattonboggs-just-got-nastier.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Roger Parloff, Litigation Finance Firm in Chevron Case Says it Was
Duped by Patton Boggs, CNNMONEY (Apr. 17, 2013, 1:16 PM),
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/17/burford-patton-boggs-chevron-suit.
307. Id.
308. See Daniel Fisher, Chevron Plaintiffs Lose a Crucial Round in Battle to
Enforce $18 Billion Judgment, FORBES (May 2, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/05/02/chevron-plaintiffs-lose-a-crucial-roundin-battle-to-enforce-18-billion-judgment.
The judge in Canada stated, “The
jurisdiction where Chevron owns assets is only a short distance from this
courthouse—in less than an hour’s drive one can cross a bridge [into the United
States],” and that “[t]here is nothing in Ontario to fight over.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court was essentially saying that the LAPs must trek to the U.S.
if they want to enforce their judgment. Id.
309. Daniel Fisher, Donziger’s Woes Increase as Lawyers Seek to Withdraw From
Chevron Case, FORBES (May 4, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
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The way the Chevron-Ecuador story has unfolded begs the
question of how much time and money was spent at the expense of so
many individuals and entities—all in an attempt to take advantage of
a polluted rainforest and its inhabitants. Given that there is little
remedy in international law and a similar pattern of litigation is
bound to happen again, federal courts should adopt a new test for
issuing anti-enforcement injunctions to prevent aggressive,
multinational enforcement proceedings when the above-described
factors are met. Such a test would create a balance between
international comity concerns and the interest in both preventing
proceedings to enforce a fraudulent judgment from occurring and
providing an avenue for judgment-debtors to pursue when they are,
or may become, subject to such proceedings.

danielfisher/2013/05/04/donzigers-woes-increase-as-lawyers-seek-to-withdraw-fromchevron-case/ (internal quotation marks omitted).

